Pressing  out the Wrinkles in Maryland\u27s Shield Law for Journalists by Bortz, Bruce L. & Bortz, Laurie R.
University of Baltimore Law Review
Volume 8
Issue 3 Spring 1979 Article 3
1979




Smith, Somerville and Case
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/ublr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Baltimore Law Review by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information,
please contact snolan@ubalt.edu.
Recommended Citation
Bortz, Bruce L. and Bortz, Laurie R. (1979) ""Pressing" out the Wrinkles in Maryland's Shield Law for Journalists," University of
Baltimore Law Review: Vol. 8: Iss. 3, Article 3.
Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/ublr/vol8/iss3/3
"PRESSING" OUT THE WRINKLES IN MARYLAND'S 
SHIELD LAW FOR JOURNALISTS 
Bruce L. Bortzt and Laurie R. Bortzt 
Little has been written about Maryland's shield lawl for 
journalists in the eighty-three years that it has existed. In 
this Article, the authors provide a history and analysis of 
the law, along with recommendations for its improvement. 
I. MARYLAND BREAKS GROUND 
During the first weeks of 1896,2 John T. Morris, a reporter for the 
Baltimore Sun, stumbled upon information3 strongly suggesting that 
some of Baltimore's elected officials and policemen were on the 
payrolls of illegal gambling establishments. 4 Morris incorporated 
this information in an article that the newspaper published. Among 
those who read it were the members of a Baltimore City grand jury 
investigating the seamy alliance between those violating gambling 
laws and those sworn to enforce them.5 In fact, the grand jury had 
recently heard testimony practically identical to the information 
that appeared in the Sun story. 
Suspecting that someone had leaked the story to Morris, the 
grand jury subpoenaed him, and demanded to know his source. 
When the reporter refused to divulge it, the judge, who happened to 
be a friend of Morris',6 decided that he was not guilty of contempt, 
but advised the grand jury that it could send Morris to prison on its 
t B.A., 1973, Johns Hopkins University; M.S., 1975 Boston University School of 
Public Communication; J.D., 1978, University of Maryland; Member, Maryland 
Bar. 
t B.A., 1973, Boston University; J.D., 1978, University of Baltimore; Associate, 
Smith, Somerville and Case, Baltimore, Maryland; Member, Maryland Bar. 
1. "Shield law" is a term "commonly and widely applied to statutes granting 
newsmen and other media representatives the privilege of declining to reveal 
confidential sources of information." In re Farber, 78 N.J. 259, 269, 394 A.2d 330, 
335 (1978). 
2. The actual date is uncertain. Baltimore Sun editor Hamilton Owens once 
suggested Morris might have come upon the information in 1895 or even the year 
before. Letter from Hamilton Owens to Matthew Page Andrews (September 22, 
1928) (on file in the Maryland Room, Enoch Pratt Free Library, Baltimore, 
Maryland). The Sun papers' official history says that Morris acquired it early in 
1896. JOHNSON, KENT, MENCKEN, & OWENS, THE SUNPAPERS OF BALTIMORE 215 
(1937). fhereinafter cited as JOHNSON, KENT, MENCKEN, & OWENS]. 
:3. One source suggests a friend of Morris' tipped him off. Letter from Harold E. 
West to Matthew Page Andrews (September 26, 1928) (on file in the"Maryland 
Room, Enoch Pratt Free Library, Baltimore, Maryland). 
4. Letter from Hamilton Owens to Matthew Page Andrews (September 20, 1928) (on 
file in the Maryland Room, Enoch Pratt Free Library, Baltimore, Maryland). 
5. Baltimore American, March 8, 1937. 
6. Letter from Harold E. West to Matthew Page Andrews, supra note 3. 
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motion. It did SO,7 and Morris spent the next five days in the city jail. 
When the grand jury's term ended, so did the reporter's prison stay.8 
Though doubtless pleased with their colleague's quick release 
from jail, the Journalists' Club, an organization of newspapermen, 
was nonetheless convinced that the interests of its profession would be 
ill-served if its members could be forced to choose between their 
freedom or the disclosure of the names of their confidential sources.9 
Thus, the club set its sights on persuading the newly elected, 
Republican dominated, General Assembly and Republican Governor 
Lowndes to enact legislation to protect Maryland reporters unwilling 
to reveal their confidential sources. The club's efforts paid off. On 
April 2, 1896, Maryland's legislature changed the common law then 
applicable to journalists and replaced it with an evidentiary 
privilege enabling reporters to refuse to disclose their sources of 
information. The law the club so strongly pushed became the 
nation's first "press shield law."lo 
That legal commentators did not universally hail the new law 
would be a gross understatement. Professor Wigmore did not mince 
words when he called the enactment "as detestable in substance as it 
is crude in form,"ll noting that "for more than three centuries, it has 
been recognized as a fundamental maxim that the public is entitled 
to every man's evidence."l2 A law this much at variance with 
precedent, he predicted, would "probably remain unique."l:l 
For almost thirty years, Wigmore's prognostication proved 
correct. 14 Not a single state followed Maryland's ground-breaking 
example. That did not mean, however, that the press and law 
enforcement personnel did not clash during these years. They did, 
7. JOHNSON, KENT, MENCKEN, & OWENS, supra note 2, at 215. 
8. Lightman v. State, 15 Md. App. 713, 717 n.2, 294 A.2d 149, 152 n.2 (1972), afi'd, 
266 Md. 550, 295 A.2d 212 (1972). See generally Note, The Right of a Newsman to 
Refrain From Divulging the Sources of His Information, 36 VA. L. REV. 61 (1950); 
EDITOR & PUBLISHER, Sept. 1, 1934, at 9; Baltimore Sun, June 24, 1972, at A14, 
col. 4. The reporter spent nights with his family at home, thanks to a 
compassionate warden who released him every evening at dark on the condition 
that he return each morning at dawn for lockup. 
9. Letter from Harold E. West to Matthew Page Andrews, supra note 3. 
10. Law of April 2, 1896, ch. 249, 1896 Md. Laws 437 (now codified at MD. CTS. & 
JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §9-112 (1974». The 1896 law read as follows: 
No person engaged in, connected with or employed on a newspaper or 
journal shall be compelled to disclose, in any legal proceeding or trial or 
before any committee of the legislature or elsewhere, the source of any 
news or information procured or obtained by him for and published in 
the newspaper on and in which he is engaged, connected with or 
employed. 
11. J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §2286 (2d ed. 1923). 
12. Id. § 2192. Accord, Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 
910 (1958). 
13. J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2286 (2d ed. 1923). 
14. New Jersey was the first state after Maryland to act. See H. ZUCKMAN & J. 
GAYNES, MASS COMMUNICATIONS LAW (1977). [hereinafter cited as ZUCKMAN' & 
GAYNES]. 
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particularly at the state and local levels. 15 Typically, a reporter 
would write an expose on official corruption, gambling, prostitution, 
or the like. After such a story was published the local prosecutor 
would be spurred to conduct an investigation, or risk the appearance 
of shirking his duties. If he subpoenaed anyone else ahead of the 
reporter, however, it would appear that the prosecutor himself knew 
of the crime all along. Thus, he would subpoena the reporter first, 
demanding that he provide him with the names of his informants. 
Although the press usually had the prestige or the political muscle to 
reach an out-of-court accommodation with the prosecutor, in a 
number of states, especially after World War II, such confrontations 
prompted the passage of shield laws.16 Most of these laws did little 
more than give reporters the right not to disclose the identities of 
confidential sources.17 They did not protect information gathered by 
newsmen. 
Still well ahead of the pack in 1949, Maryland put even more 
distance between itself and most other states with shield laws by 
extending to radio and television the statutory protection it had 
earlier granted the purely print media. IS Well into the fifties and 
sixties most other states continued to heed Wigmore and more 
modem legal critics, who maintained that state shield laws were 
both "unhealthy" and "unnecessary."19 In part because journalists 
found merit in this argument, leaders of the journalistic community 
as recently as 1963 were advocating that the states adopt a uniform 
law that would afford newsmen only partial protection. For example, 
the "Model Confidential Communications Statute" of Sigma Delta 
Chi, the national journalism society, prohibited the compelled 
disclosure of a newsman's sources, but it did not so much as suggest 
a privilege for information gathered by a newsman. W 
II. CONGRESS TRIES ITS HAND 
At the federal level, there was less tension between the 
government and the media. Only infrequently did the federal 
15. See generally F. Graham, Press Freedoms Under Pressure, Background Paper for 
the Twentieth Century Fund 65 (1972). rhereinafter cited as Graham, Paper). 
16. E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 12, §21-142 (1977); ARK. STAT. ANN. §43-917 (1977); Ky. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.100 (Baldwin 1978); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2739.04, 
2739.11, 2739.12 (Page Supp. 1977). These states enacted shield laws within eight 
years after the end of World War II. 
17. Graham, Paper, supra note 15. 
18. Law of April 29, 1949, ch. 614, 1949 Md. Laws 1477. Arkansas was the first state 
to provide protection to television and radio authority. 
19. See, e.g., Comment, Journalists' Testimonial Privilege, 9 CLEV.·MAR. L. REV. 311 
(1960). See also Note, The Right of A Newsman to Refrain From Divulging the 
Sources of His Information, 36 VA. L. REV. 61 (1950). 
20. Graham, Paper, supra note 15, at 66. 
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government seek the media's help,21 and when it did, the press more 
often than not quietly furnished the Justice Department with the 
information it sought. In a few instances, however, preliminary 
media-government negotiations ended in agreements that the 
government would issue subpoenas with which the media would 
comply.22 Cooperation of this sort took place in at least two types of 
federal investigations: those aimed at organized crime and those 
aimed at violence against civil rights advocates. 23 
In 1969, the picture began to change drastically.24 No longer 
were Justice Department subpoenas of newsmen rare. Beginning 
that year, federal authorities investigating radical groups suddenly 
became eager to coerce the cooperation of the media. 25 More 
significant than the increased number of demands placed on the 
media were the new and varied forms these demands were taking. 
While the federal government once had been interested solely in 
compelling the disclosure of a newsman's confidential sources, it 
now demanded notes, tapes, film, photographs, financial records and 
personal testimony from reporters serving newspapers, news 
magazines, and the broadcast media.26 From 1969 until mid-1971, 
the National Broadcasting Company (NBC), the Columbia Broad-
casting System (CBS) and the stations they owned and operated 
21. Id. at 67. See also ZUCKMAN & GAYNES, supra 14, at 167. Prior to 1970 there were 
fewer than forty reported contempt cases for newsmen's refusal to testify. H. 
NELSON & D. TEETER, LAw OF MAss COMMUNICATIONS 351 (2d ed. 1973). 
22. See Graham, Paper, supra note 15. A 1975 Justice Department study revealed 
that reporters complied willingly with subpoenas in eighty percent of the cases in 
which they were subpoenaed. In fact, many reporters requested that the court or 
government agency issue the subpoena in the first place. See BROADCASTING, 
June 2, 1975, at 54. 
23. See Graham, Paper, supra note 15. 
24. For a detailed discussion on the more recent proliferation of subpoenas, see text 
accompanying notes 57-62 infra. 
25. Graham, Paper, supra note 15, at 82. Writes Graham: 
Newsmen had occasionally complained that prosecutors called them to 
testify before grand juries to dignify a case that was otherwise based on 
questionable witnesses. Sometimes, too, their testimony was not actually 
needed, but their prestigious names and publishers lent credibility to the 
government's case. 
Graham believes that such tactics by the government do not advance the truth· 
finding process of the courts. Id. at 83. Zuckman and Gaynes suggest a number 
of reasons why prosecutors, judges, legislators and other government officials 
began 
to seek unpublished information of interest to them in the hands and 
heads of newspersons. Mutual distrust and even enmity between public 
officials and reporters began to grow, particularly in the large urban 
areas, fueled at least in part by the Vietnam war, a troubled economy, 
widespread graft and corruption at all levels of government, leaks of 
secret government information, doubtful media coverage of government 
and its personnel and what some might characterize as anti· 
establishmentarianism by some elements of the Media. 
ZUCKMAN & GAYNES, supra note 14, at 167-68. 
26. Graham, Paper, supra note 15, at 62. 
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received 124 subpoenas, mostly from federal and state prosecutors.27 
Over the same two and one-half year span, the federal government 
served twenty subpoenas on a single Chicago newspaper publishing 
company - Field Enterprises Incorporated.28 A reluctance to 
displease influential publishers and broadcasters hardly character-
ized the federal prosecutors of the time. 
All the while, it was, as writer Theodore White has noted, 
"accepted in American politics that a reporter's protection of his 
sources could not be violated. No law said so; no ruling said so; it 
was simply taken for granted." 29 Many thoughtful journalists 
believed that the Supreme Court tacitly shared their belief that state 
shield laws were largely unnecessary because of the broad language 
of the first amendment. 30 Yet, the Court's failure to recognize 
expressly a constitutional privilege for newsmen caused some to 
doubt whether it truly believed in the existence of such a first 
amendment protection. To resolve newsmen's lingering concern, 
United States Congressmen in 1970, 1971, and 1972 tossed a total of 
32 bills relating to newsmen's privileges into the Congressional 
hopper.31 Despite such efforts, no federal shield law was enacted 
during this period. 
III. THE SUPREME COURT TAKES A STAND 
In 1970 in Caldwell v. United States,32 the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals ruled that the first amendment conferred a qualified 
privilege on a newsman. The court held that in the absence of a 
27. Id. at 64. A handful of defense counsel, not prosecutors, was responsible for a 
small number of these subpoenas. See Hearings on Newsman's Privilege Before 
Subcommittee No.3 of the House of Rep. Comm. of the Judiciary, ~2d Cong., 1st 
Sess. 204 (Oct. 24, 1972). 
28. Graham, Paper, supra note 15, at 62. 
29. White, Why The Jailing of Farber 'Terrifies Me,' New York Times Magazine, 
Nov. 29, 1978, at 76. Until the Branzburg decision, the Supreme Court had 
displayed a marked reluctance to address the issue of the newsman's privilege. 
Certiorari was denied on at least three occasions when the issue was raised. 
Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958); Murphy 
v. Colorado (Colo. Sup. Ct. No. 19604 unreported opinion), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 
843 (1961); State v. Buchanan, 250 Or. 244, 436 P.2d 726, cert. denied, 392 U.S. 
905 (1968). 
30. See, e.g., Note, 77 HARV. L. REV. 556, 558-59 (1964), in which the author makes a 
strong argument that the remedy to the uncertainty is best left to the courts, not 
to the legislatures. 
31. E.g., H.R. 1604, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970); H.R. 16328, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 
(1970); S. 1131, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). See also H.R. 5928, 93d Cong., 1st 
Sess. (1973); S. 1128, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); H.R. 215, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1973). H.R. 215, introduced by Rep. Kastenmaier, contained only minor 
limitations on the privilege and was the most widely debated of these bills. 
Broadcasting endorsed this bill when it emerged from the House Judiciary-
Subcommittee N. 3 in June, 1973. 
For a detailed discussion of the need for a federal shield law, see Landau & 
Graham, The Federal Shield Law We Need, COLUM. JOURNAUSM REV. 
(Marchi April 1973) 26. [hereinafter cited as Landau & Graham, Federal Law]. 
32. 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970). 
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compelling governmental interest, a reporter could not be forced to 
appear before a grand jury to disclose confidential information. 
Subsequently, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the 
conflict between Caldwell and two state court decisions, Branzburg 
v. Pound33 and In re Pappas,34 which had refused to extend to 
reporters the privilege to defy grand jury subpoenas. In response, 
newsmen from around the country contributed affidavits and amicus 
curiae briefs, hoping to persuade the Court to recognize a constitu-
tional privilege for newsmen. J. Anthony Lukas, then a reporter for 
the New York Times, told the Court: "Violate one man's confidence 
and sources start drying up all over the place."35 In his affidavit, 
CBS newsman Dan Rather referred to a long-time friend and 
confidential news source: 
This honest, decent citizen, who cares deeply about his 
country, has now told me that he feels that pressure from the 
Government, enforced by the courts, may lead to violations 
of confidence, and he is therefore unwilling to continue to 
communicate with me on the basis of trust which existed 
between US. 36 
Gilbert Noble, at the time of his affidavit a reporter covering the 
black community for the American Broadcasting Company (ABC), 
said that if he were to comply with a government subpoena, it would 
be impossible for him to go back to that beat.37 The affidavit of ABC 
reporter Timothy Knight asserted that some groups were becoming 
aware of the increasing threat government subpoenas posed for 
them. In. the late sixties, Knight had done a news feature on the 
Black Panthers of San Francisco Bay, with the group's cooperation. 
In early 1970, however, when he returned to do another story on the 
Black Panthers, they refused to cooperate for fear that the 
government would subpoena ABC's "outtakes," portions of film 
edited out of the story actually aired. Knight's project ended when 
ABC refused to accede to the Panthers' request that it pledge to fight 
any government subpoenas.38 
33. 461 S.W.2d 345 (Ky. 1971). 
34. 358 Mass. 604, 266 N.E.2d 297 (1971). 
35. Amicus Curiae Brief for Appellee at 39, United States v. Caldwell, 408 U.S. 665 
(1972). 
36. [d. at 59. 
37. [d. at 37. 
38. [d. at 28. Though they did not contribute affidavits to the Court, several other 
prominent newsmen have commented on the central issue involved. Walter 
Cronkite, the "dean" of broadcast journalism, once offered this wry comment: 
"Advice for a modem lawman: let the reporters do it for you." I. FANG, 
TELEVISION NEWS 354 (1972). On the subject of "off the record" conversations, 
Eric Sevareid said that "[slhould a widespread impression develop that my 
information is subject to claim by government investigators, this traditional 
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The view articulated in newsmen's affidavits was countered by 
the argument that there was scant empirical proof that the lack of a 
judicially proclaimed newsmen's privilege significantly dissuaded 
sources from communicating information to reporters.39 Newsmen, it 
was asserted, could still convince their sources that newsmen would 
go to jail before betraying a confidence. Moreover, even if reporters 
chose to disclose the sources of their information rather than be 
thrown behind bars, the flow of news would be little affected. Many 
news sources would be so insistent that their information appear 
before the public that they would be willing to risk being identified,40 
or so it was argued. 
On June 29, 1972, the Supreme Court ruled on the existence vel 
non of a newsmen's privilege. Its 5-4 decision in Branzburg v. Hayes41 
was at once a landmark decision and a supreme shock to the 
journalistic community.42 The Branzburg Court held that a federal 
or state grand jury could compel a newsman to appear and testify 
before it concerning information that sources revealed to him in 
confidence. The common law and the Constitution, said the Court, 
afforded the newsman, like the ordinary citizen, no special privilege 
to keep such information to himself. Justice Byron White apparently 
was not convinced by the newmen's affidavits. In his majority 
opinion, he wrote that "from the beginning of our country, the press 
has operated without constitutional protection for press informants 
and the press has flourished. The existing common law rules have 
not been a serious obstacle to either the development or retention of 
confidential news sources by the press."43 
Criticism of the decision and Justice White's reasoning swiftly 
came from journalistic organizations around the country. This 
relationship, essential to my kind of work, would be most seriously jeopardized. I 
would be less well·informed myself, and of less use to the general public as an 
interpreter or analyst of public affairs." E. Sevareid, BROADCASTING, May 20, 
1970, at 50. Dr. Frank Stanton, president of CBS for 26 years and nicknamed 
"Mr. Integrity" by his colleagues in the industry, once remarked: "Certainly 
everyone believes in a fair trial. But only those who want to restrict that freedom 
believe responsibility should be enforced by law." Remarks before the annual 
Abe Lincoln awards dinner of the Radio and Television Commission of the 
Southern Baptist Convention (Feb. 7, 1974). For an excellent discussion by 
newsmen and jurists of the ethical and legal problems surrounding the use of 
subpoenas to force disclosure of confidential sources, see The Southern 
California Conference on the Media and the Law 55-104 (Times Mirror Press 
1977). 
39. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 693 (1972). 
40. Graham, Paper, supra note 15, at 17. 
41. 408 U.S. 665 (1972). 
42. Ironically, Branzburg came a mere twelve days after the Watergate break·in; 
without the assistance of investigative reporting and the use of confidential 
sources, the Watergate scandal might never have been revealed. Friedman, The 
Freedom of the Press Under Siege, NEW TIMES, Dec. 11, 1978, at 41. [hereinafter 
cited as Friedman, Siege]. 
43. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 698-99 (1972). 
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criticism would have been more strident had Justices Burger, 
Rehnquist, Blackmun, and White prevailed in their contention that 
even a qualified press privilege should not exist. When balancing 
law enforement's needs against the first amendment, said these four, 
the latter should always give way. Fortunately, so far as the press 
was concerned, five justices felt otherwise, recognizing the impor· 
tance of granting the press at least a qualified privilege.44 Justices 
Brennan, Douglas, Marshall, Powell and Stewart agreed that the 
Constitution accorded Congress and the respective state legislatures 
the power to fashion laws establishing such a privilege. 
IV. AFrER BRANZBURG: CONGRESS FAILS AGAIN 
Following the Court's advice, Congress intensified its effort to 
pass a federal shield law. In the fall of 1972 a House subcommittee 
conducted extensive hearings on the subject.45 Then, in the first two 
weeks of the 1973 session, Congressmen introduced twenty·four bills 
drafted to counteract the potential effects of Branzburg. All sought 
to protect from judicially compelled disclosure both the source and 
content of confidential information, whether or not the information 
was ever published or broadcast; as well as the source and content of 
nonconfidential information, such as television outtakes or a 
reporter's notes from a purely public event.46 
In the spring of 1973, Congress again held hearings on bills 
proposing a federal privilege. Rather than demonstrating the 
overwhelming need for a federal shield law, these hearings made 
evident the media's overwhelming lack of agreement on the subject 
of federal protection.47 Eventually, the American News Publishing 
Association endorsed a model bill drafted by its Ad Hoc Drafting 
Committee.48 Still, there remained dissension in the media's ranks, 
caused in part by a dispute over whether to apply a newsman's 
privilege only to federal proceedings or to extend its protection to the 
state level as well.49 Not only could the various factions not agree on 
how expansive a federal shield law ought to be, but they also differed 
44. See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 709 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring). 
Also mentioned by the Court was the states' power to construe their constitutions 
"so as to recognize a newsman's privilege." Id. at 706. 
45. See Landau & Graham, Federal Law, supra note 31, at 27. 
46. Collins, Congress Grapples With Press Bill, Milwaukee Journal, March 25, 1973, 
at 16. 
47. QUILL, April, 1973, at 37. Three views emerged: one favored an absolute 
privilege; another argued for nothing aside from the first amendment; still 
another urged that reporters should not be given too broad an exemption. EDITOR 
& PUBLISHER, March 15, 1975, at 23. 
48. QUILL, supra note 47. 
49. Id. at 34. Some federal courts have resolved this dispute, in part, by regarding 
state shield laws as persuasive authority in the absence of a federal statute. See, 
e.g., Lewis v. United States, 517 F.2d 236, 237 (9th Cir. 1975); Baker v. F & F 
Invest., 470 F.2d 778, 781 (2d Cir. 1972). 
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on whether there was a need for such a law at all.50 One group stated 
its belief that the first amendment conferred all the protection they, 
as reporters, would ever need. The Supreme Court, they felt 
confident, would someday reverse its decision in Branzburg, and 
adopt their construction of the Constitution.51 
Many in the media who sensed the impact Branzburg was 
beginning to have on them were not content to sit idly by.52 The 
then-president of the CBS television network, Arthur Taylor, 
contended, for example, that the decision had triggered a "devastat-
ing proliferation of subpoenas and jailings."53 Though the first few 
years after Branzburg witnessed a diminution in America's 
Southeast Asian involvement and in the activities of various 
militant organizations, the frequency with which newsmen were 
subpoenaed nonetheless increased. One newsman noted that the 
Justice Department issued more subpoenas during the first eighteen 
weeks of 1975 than during the preceding three and one-half years.54 
Almost to a man, media figures began to claim that the 
subpoenas were having a disastr.ous effect on the practice of their 
profession. Principally, they said, the subpoenas were drying up 
their sources.55 In a July 25, 1978 editorial the New York Times 
expressed this point of view: 
When, as frequently occurs around the White House or a 
courthouse, an informant offers us news in exchange for a 
50. Graham, Paper, supra note 15, at 16. One federal court noted that Congress had 
only "flirted" with the notion of a federal shield law. Farr v. Pitchess, 522 F.2d 
464, 467 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976). 
51. In a 1974 editorial, Broadcasting Magazine commented that the American Bar 
Association may have done journalism a service in February, 1974, when its 
House of Delegates voted 157-122 to reject the proposition that a reporter's 
privilege was essential "to protect the public interest." Afraid that the law would 
become so riddled with exceptions that the free press would be more hampered 
than helped, Broadcasting stated that "the wisest course is to abandon the effort 
to forge a legislative shield. Let the First Amendment stand as the primary 
word." BROADCASTING, Feb. 18, 1974, at 9. See also Dixon, The Constitution Is 
Shield Law Enoui!h For Newsmen, 60 A.B.A.J. 707 (1974). 
52. The American Newspaper Publisher's Association expressed what was probably 
the sentiment of most journalists when it succinctly said that "reliance on the 
First Amendment guarantees is not enough." BROADCASTING, April 29, 1974, at 
43. 
53. BROADCASTING, June 3, 1975, at 54. At the time, Mr. Taylor was also chairman of 
the First Amendment Research and Defense Fund of the Reporters' Committee 
for Freedom of the Press, a Washington-based group that has assisted in the 
formulation of federal and state shield laws. To date, however, the steering 
committee of the Reporters Committee has yet to form a consensus on what, if 
anything, would constitute a model statute for either the states or the federal 
government. 
54. Sharing the News with Justice, COLUM. JOURNALISM REv. (Sept.lOct., 1975) at 
18. 
55. This deterrent effect is much stronger than that which might exist in the 
lawyer/client or doctor/patient relationship, since the informant in those 
relationships is strongly motivated to reveal information out of the urgency of 
his need for medical or legal help. See Comment, The Newsman's Privilege: 
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pledge of confidentiality, we give priority to the information . 
. . . Without our bond of trust, the information might never 
be known. That is how we get our best stories - the ones 
that touch the most sensitive nerves of state, that identify 
an injustice or break open a conspiracy, and that for reasons 
of luck or skill come only to one newspaper and to no other. 
A frightened citizen, an angry government official, a 
disillusioned conspirator - they reach out periodically to the 
press or respond honestly to our questions to reveal what 
others seek to hide. They dare not risk their jobs or 
reputations or safety by speaking out in public, but they 
have learned to trust in the promise of protection that can be 
had from most reporters. "Don't just take it from me," they 
will say. "Go see if what I tell you is not right. Don't print it 
if you can't prove it. But don't ever tell who told yoU."56 
What would become of a working press unable to assure 
confidentiality to such sources?, asked A.M. Rosenthal, managing 
editor of the New York Times. 57 Branzburg portended increasing 
dependency on the self-serving press releases of government and 
business. According to media critic Ben Bagdikian, the American 
press was already dangerously close to being a "handout press."58 
His studies showed that eighty-two percent of all news stories 
originated with the source itself. 
Part of the media's comments about Branzburg's impact 
centered on the degree to which investigative reporting had 
benefited the public over the years. The muckraker's tradition was a 
venerable one in America, they said, pointing to Lincoln Steffens 
and Shame of the Cities, to Upton .sinclair and The Jungle, and to 
Ida Tarbell and her numerous attacks on America's oil trusts.59 
Government Investigations, Criminal Prosecution and Private Litigation, 58 
CALIF. L. REV. 1198, 1215 (1970). See also Goldstein, Newsmen and Their 
Confidential Sources, NEW REPUBLIC, March 21, 1970, at 14. The informant is 
particularly deterred where his information is of an incriminating nature, 
because the newsman is without standing to assert his informant's privilege 
against self-incrimination. 
56. The Times in the Dock, The New York Times, July 25, 1978, at A14, col. 1. 
57. Carbine, The Issue of Protection for Newsperson Sources, Raised by Agnew and 
also Lowered, Lurks There Still, Baltimore Evening Sun, Jan. 22, 1974, at A8, col. 
1 (paraphrasing Mr. Rosenthal). 
58. B. BAGDIKIAN, THE EFFETE CONSPIRACY 27 (1972). 
59. White, Why the Jailing of Farber 'Terrifies Me,' New York Times Magazine, Nov. 
29, 1978, at 76. Many years after the investigative reporting of Steffens, Sinclair 
and Tarbell, and many years before investigative reporting became fashionable, 
Judge Joseph Sherbow of the Supreme Bench of Baltimore, Maryland 
acknowledged that "many instances of crime and corruption have been brought 
to light by newspaper investigations ... when complacent public officials or 
grand juries have failed to act." Address by Judge Sherbow at 53d Annual 
Maryland State Bar Association Meeting (June 24, 1948). In 1969, somewhat 
before the heyday of inVestigative reporting, the Managing Editor of the San 
Francisco Chronicle remarked in much the same vein: "An absolutely staggering 
number of news stories, political and non-political, arise from the digging of the 
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Columnist James Reston succinctly called to mind more recent 
examples of such reporting when he wrote that "[a]ll the information 
that exposed the facts about the Vietnam tragedy and the Watergate 
conspiracy came into the press from insiders who were determined to 
tell the truth as they saw it."60 
Perhaps because their arguments are intuitive or speculative, 
respected members of the press have been able to influence Congress 
to a lesser extent than they hoped. The plethora of proposed shield 
law bills seeking to accord legal status to a newsman's privilege that 
characterized earlier Congresses is conspicuously absent from the 
96th Congress.61 
Advocates of shield laws, however, have been far more 
successful in the state legislatures, twenty-six of which have passed 
laws that grant the press a privilege in its news-gathering 
activities.62 Almost one-third of these states passed shield laws or 
amended existing ones after the Supreme Court issued its Branzburg 
decision.63 
reporter after he has been confidentially informed that there was something to 
dig for." Guest & Stenzler, The Constitutional Argument for Newsmen 
Concealing Their Sources, 64 NEV. U.L. REV. 18, 60-61 (1969). 
60. Reston, A Letter to Mr. Justice Whizzer, Baltimore Evening Sun, June 2, 1978 at 
A8, col. 4. 
61. As of this writing, no new shield law bills have been introduced. 
62. ALA. CODE tit. 12, §21-142 (1977); ALASKA STAT. §§09.25.150, 09.25.160 (1973); 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2237 (Supp. 1978); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-917 (1977); 
CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070 (West Supp. 1979); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 4320-4326 
(1975); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 51, §§ 111-119 (Smith·Hurd Supp. 1979); IND. CODE 
ANN. § 2-1733 (Burns 1968); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 421.100 (Baldwin 1969); LA. 
REV. STAT. ANN. §§45.1451-.1454 (West Supp. 1979); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. 
CODE ANN. §9-112 (1974); MICH. COMPo LAws §767.5a (1968); MINN. STAT. 
§ 595.021 (Supp. 1978); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 26-1-901 to -903 (1978); NEB. 
REV. STAT. §§20-144 to -147 (1977); NEV. REV. STAT. §49.275 (1973); N.J. REV. 
STAT. §§2A.84A-21, .84A-21a (Supp. 1978-79); N.M. STAT. ANN. §20-1-12.1 
(Supp. 1975); N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAw §79-h (McKinney 1976); N.D. CENT. CODE 
§ 31-01-06.2 (1976); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2739.04, 2739.11, 2739.12 (Page 
Supp. 1979); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2506 (Supp. 1978-79); OR. REV. STAT. 
§ 44.510 (1975); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 330 (Purdon Supp. 1978-79); R.1. 
GEN. LAws §§9-19-.1-1 to -19.1-3 (Supp. 1977); TENN. CODE ANN. §24-113 
(Supp. 1977). 
63. At the state level, bills were before a dozen legislatures at the same time. FOI 
Digest passim, Aug. 1972 - July 1973 (University of Missouri). Many of the bills 
introduced gave protection without loophole or condition, but almost always the 
shield was weakened in the course of the legislative process. Cook, Battle over 
News 'Shield' Shifted to Legislature, Capital Times (Madison, Wis.), Apr. 26, 
1973, at 5. The states that have acted since Branzburg include California, 
Delaware, Indiana, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Mexico, Nevada, Oregon and 
Tennessee. 
In 1975, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform Laws ended 
work on a proposed Uniform Act that would have included an unqualified 
privilege not to identify confidential sources and, in some instances, to withhold 
"confidential information." A press release stated that "[t]he conference voted to 
end consideration [of the proposal] when members could not agree on details or 
that a need existed." EDITOR & PUBLISHER, Aug. 30, 1975, at 18. 
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v. THE LIGHTMAN CASE 
It was not Branzburg that caused the Maryland General 
Assembly to reconsider the state's shield law for journalists. 
Legislative activity in Maryland, rather, came as a response to '1972 
decisions of the state's courts in Lightman v. State,64 the only 
appellate case thus far to interpret the statute since it was first 
enacted in 1896.65 
The Lightman case had its roots in July, 1971 when David 
Lightman, a reporter for the Baltimore Evening Sun, was sent to 
Ocean City, Maryland to investigate illegal drug traffic in the ocean 
resort. The resulting article was published under the banner 
headline "Ocean City: Where The Drugs Are?" The article described 
two incidents, based upon Lightman's personal observations, which 
aroused special interest. The first was that an unnamed Ocean City 
shopkeeper had offered a customer some marijuana to use in testing 
a pipe she was trying to sell him. The second raised even -more 
eyebrows. Though a uniformed police officer was in the shop at the 
time, Lightman's article recounted that the shopkeeper assured the 
customer that there was no reason to worry because the police "don't 
come sniffing around."66 
At the time Lightmim's story was published, drug trafficking in 
Ocean City was also the subject of a Worcester County, Maryland 
grand jury investigation. As a result of its investigation, the grand 
jury subpoenaed Lightman, and asked him to identify the shop-
keeper and the indifferent police officer, and to give the location of 
the shop referred to in his article.67 The reporter refused to answer 
and was held in contempt. 
On appeal, Lightman contended that the shopkeeper was the 
source of the information for his story, and thus the information 
sought by the grand jury was privileged by the Maryland press 
shield statute, which provided that a news reporter could not be 
compelled to disclose the source of any published information.68 
Were he to provide even the barest facts, Lightman said, the grand 
jury would be able to discover the name of his source. 
In response, the state argued that the source of the news story 
was not the shopkeeper, but the reporter who had personally 
- observed the transaction.69 Contending that the newsmen's privilege 
64. 15 Md. App. 713, 294 A.2d 149, aff'd per curiam, 266 Md. 550, 295 A.2d 212 (1972), 
cert. denied, 411 U.S. 951 (1973). 
65. But see State v. Sheridan, 248 Md. 320, 236 A.2d 18 (1967) (an earlier case 
involving the predecessor statute, MD. ANN. CODE art. 35, § 2 (1965), which was 
dismissed for mootness). 
66. 15 Md. App. at 715, 294 A.2d at 15I. 
67. [d. 
68. MD. ANN. CODE art. 35, § 2 (1965) (now codified as MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE 
ANN. § 9-112 (1974». 
69. 15 Md. App. at 723-24, 294 A.2d at 156. 
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statute protects only the source of information and not the 
information itself, the state claimed that the statute did not apply to 
the information in Lightman's article. The stat.e also claimed that 
the statute only protects the source of information when the 
information is received in confidence.70 Because Lightman had not 
introduced himself as a reporter, and the shopkeeper did not provide 
any information with the knowledge that Lightman was a reporter,71 
the statute was, according to the state, inapplicable. 
Although the Maryland Court of Special Appeals rejected the 
state's argument that the Maryland law shields from disclosure the 
source of published information only when a confidential relation-
ship exists between a newsman and his source,72 it ruled in favor of 
the state and upheld the contempt order. The court held that when a 
newsman personally observes criminal activity, that newsman, and 
not the person observed, is the "source" of the information, and, 
consequently, he may be lawfully compelled to disclose the location 
of the commission of the criminal activity and the identity of the 
participants before a grand jury. In a per curiam opinion the court of 
appeals affirmed the ruling in Lightman. 73 
VI. THE MARYLAND GENERAL ASSEMBLY REACTS TO 
LIGHTMAN 
In response to the Lightman decision, enactment of a Maryland 
law with added protections for reporters like Lightman became the 
goal of at least some journalists in the state. James Day, president of 
the Maryland Professional Chapter of Sigma Delta Chi, declared 
that "[ w]e need specific guidelines to determine in what areas the 
reporter is entitled to privileged information and in what areas law 
enforcement agencies can infringe on that right."74 In January, 
1973, Delegates Robey, Blumenthal, and Hutchinson each intro-
duced similar bills protecting confidential information, whether 
supplied to the newsman or personally observed by him, as well as 
protecting sources to whom the newsman promised confidentiality. 75 
The three delegates soon consolidated their efforts into a single 
bill. 76 On February 16, the House Judiciary Committee began 
consideration of House Bill 475 by voting down an amendment that 
would have provided protection only if the reporter openly identified 
himself as a professional newsman. 77 Also rejected was a suggested 
70. Id. 
71. Id. at 716-17, 294 A.2d at 152. 
72. Id. at 724, 294 A.2d at 156. 
73. 266 Md. 550, 295 A.2d 212 (1972). 
74. Hurwitz, How Free Is America's Press?, BALTIMORE MAGAZINE, Feb. 1973, at 30. 
75. H.B. 353 (1973); H.B. 336 (1973); H.B. 382 (1973). 
76. H.B. 475 (1973). 
77. Journal of ProceedinRs of the House of DeleRates of Maryland 584 (1973). 
474 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 8 
definition of a source as "an actual person who wishes to expose a 
wrongdoing to a known newsperson and who does not wish his 
identity to be known."7s 
On February 21, the committee passed an amendment denying 
protection to information that newsmen had of criminal cons pi-
racy.79 On February 23, as the bill headed for third reading and the 
House floor, one delegate proposed that the General Assembly 
provide no protection to reporters with confidential information 
beneficial to a grand jury investigating anyone or more of the 
crimes of murder, rape, assault, narcotics violations, vice, extortion, 
graft, blackmail, or subversive activities. This attempt to weaken the 
bill was defeated by a vote of 61-39.80 Later, another delegate offered 
an amendment that would have forced newsmen to reveal to a judge 
who required, it any information the judge believed would lead the 
court to the source whose confidence the newsperson was protect-
ing.s1 On February 28, 1973, with this amendment still pending, 
House Bill 475 died quietly, the members ofthe House voting to refer 
it back to the House Judiciary Committee, where it received no 
further attention.s2 
VII. FLAWS IN THE MARYLAND LAW 
Six years after the 1973 session, Maryland reporters continue to 
practice their calling protected only by a law that, at age 83, is a 
flawed relic. Its limitations, some more apparent than others, are 
numerous. As Lightman amply illustrated, for example, a reporter 
citing Maryland's shield law can refuse to disclose a confidental 
news source, but he can be forced to divulge the information his 
source provided him. S3 The practical effect of this is, in some cases, 
78. [d. at 610. In their version of House Bill 475, Delegates Robey, Blumenthal and 
Hutchinson did not include a definition of a "source." 
79. Journal of Proceedings of the House of Delegates of Maryland 631 (1973). 
80. [d. at 651. 
81. [d. at 652. 
82. [d. at 697. The Maryland General Assembly did, however, amend the Maryland 
shiel.d law for journalists, albeit in a very minor way, while recodifying it and 
making it a part of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article of the Maryland 
Annotated Code. Law of August 22, 1973, ch. 2, 1st Sp. Sess., 1973 Md. Laws 288. 
The law's requirements are still mandatory, not permissive. Compare MD. ANN. 
CODE art. 35, § 2 (1965) with MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-112 (1974). 
See MD. ANN. CODE art. 1, § 26 (Supp. 1978) ("may not" has a mandatory 
negative effect). 
83. Lig~tman v. State, 15 Md. App. 713, 724, 294 A.2d 149, 156 (1972) ("The 
Leglslature may have enacted the statute with the primary purpose in mind of 
protecting the identity of newsmen's confidential sources."). Louisiana, like 
Maryland, has a statute which protects the source but not the information, with 
similar results as the Lightman case. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 45.1451-.1454 (West 
Supp. 1979). See also Dumez v. Houma Municipal Fire and Police Civil Servo Bd., 
341 So. 2d 1206 (La. App. 1976). 
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self-evident: it protects neither the source nor his information, as his 
information would often reveal the identity of the informant himself. 
The law is also deficient because of the different treatment it 
accords different sources. When a newsman writes about occurrences 
he personally observes, the law considers him to be his own source. 
Though the state might be able to obtain the same information from 
another source, the law still allows it to compel him to reveal all his 
information. 84 A truly effective shield law would protect information 
whether its source is the reporter himself or someone else. 
Though these drawbacks in the law hurt the media the most, 
there are others almost as harmful. While Maryland led the way in 
applying shield law protection to the electronic media,85 it failed to 
protect a host of persons who gather and disseminate the news, and 
who, as the Supreme Court has long recognized, also serve the 
public.86 Maryland's statute now protects "a person engaged in, 
connected with or employed on a newspaper or journal or for a radio 
or television station."87 Excluded, however, are writers for news 
services, news letters, news syndicates, and press associations, as 
well as freelance writers88 and writers or producers of documentary 
films.89 If the press shield law protects television and radio 
employees, there is no logical reason why it should not also protect 
these other bona fide news-gatherers. 
Equally lacking in logic is the distinction Maryland's law makes 
between published and unpublished information. Under Section 9-
112 of the Maryland Courts and Judicial Proceedings Code 
Annotated, a reporter who has spent considerable time and effort 
obtaining information for a news story may have to reveal both his 
information and his informant's identity simply because his story 
has yet to go to print or on the air.oo The state's interest in 
84. Lightman v. State, 15 Md. App. 713, 725-26, 294 A.2d 149, 157 (1972) 
(information involved a crime in progress). 
85. Law of April 29, 1949, ch. 614, 1949 Md. Laws 1477. 
86. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 690 (1972); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 
U.S. 444, 452 (1938). 
87. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-112 (1974). 
88. Because some people are afraid that anyone conducting purely personal 
investigations could also claim the benefits of the privilege, "freelance writer" 
could be construed strictly as a person qualified by either training or experience 
to be employed by or connected with the news media. Even with such a strict 
construction, the journalism student just out of school would be protected, as 
would a veteran freelance reporter. 
89. In a recent Oklahoma case, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that an 
unsalaried documentary filmmaker who did not regularly engage in gathering 
and disseminating the news could still invoke his newsman's privilege not to 
reveal sources, even though the film was never distributed. Silkwood v. Kerr-
McGee Corp., 563 F.2d 433 (10th Cir. 1977). 
90. In addition, the government body with subpoena power would be able to obtain 
such items as a reporter's original notes, sound and video tape recordings, film 
outtakes, slides, photographs, memoranda, letters, edited drafts, and expense 
account records. 
476 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 8 
compelling disclosure understandably increases when there is little 
likelihood that the information the media gathers will ever be 
disseminated. Still, to compel disclosure of all unpublished informa-
tion and sources, regardless of how far the reporter's investigation 
has progressed, is to do serious damage to the media's ability to 
gather information. 
Only a minority of state shield laws distinguish between 
published and unpublished information as Maryland's does. Mary-
land Attorney General Francis B. Burch made this clear in the 
summer of 1978 when he responded to a request for an advisory legal 
opinion on the subject from Montgomery County Delegate Marilyn 
Goldwater.91 Though the General Assembly had not said so 
specifically, Attorney General Burch concluded that it had meant to 
require publication or broadcast before the Maryland media could 
assert legal protection for information confidential sources had 
supplied them.92 Only three other states - Alabama, Arkansas, and 
Kentucky - have a similar requirement.93 
It did not take long for the media to voice its disagreement with 
the Attorney General. News director Tom Beckerer, of WBAlr TV in 
Baltimore, Maryland commented, for example, that "they are getting 
right into the gut level of the journalistic process. If sources don't 
feel protected, it will dry up that avenue of information."94 The 
Baltimore Sun's ardent response followed Beckerer's by a day: 
Maryland's shield law, oldest in the nation, will certainly 
become worthless if this week's opinion by the Attorney 
General is not overruled by the courts or the legislature. He 
said that sources may be protected only if the information 
they provide is published or broadcast. Since reporters 
almost never use everything an informant tells them, this 
would mean that no secret source could be protected. And 
consit!er what would happen to an investigation in progress 
of, say, something like the Watergate conspiracy or the 
Pallotine fraud. Before the newspaper has enough to publish 
any articles, the target of the investigation gets wind of it, 
gets a court to order that the sources of the unpublished 
allegations be identified. Result: either the reporters go to 
jail for contempt or the sources are revealed - and silenced. 
Either way, no stories. Who would be the loser in that 
91. 63 Md. Att'y Gen. Op. 347 (1978). 
92.Id. 
93. ALA. CODE tit. 12, § 21-142 (1977); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-917 (1977); Ky. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 421.100 (Baldwin 1969). Even states that do not protect unpublished 
information have required partial in camera disclosure of that information. See 
CBS v. Superior Court, 85 Cal. App. 3d 241, 149 Cal. Rptr. 421 (1978). 
94. Baltimore Morning Sun, Aug. 29, 1978, at C1, col. 6. 
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situation? The press, of course. And the sources. And, 
especially, the public.95 
477 
The public may yet be a greater loser because of an ambiguity 
present in the current statute. Maryland's shield law prohibits 
compelled disclosure "in any legal proceeding or trial or before any 
committee of the legislature or elsewhere."96 If "elsewhere" is read in 
light of the preceding list, it may not mean, under the doctrine of 
ejusdem generis, all official bodies with the power to cite newspeople 
for contempt. Thus, the newsmen's shield law might extend to 
inquiries by legislative or judicial committees, but not to state 
administrative and executive bodies, which would have free rein to 
compel disclosure. Whether the courts would construe "elsewhere" as 
meaning state but not federal bodies is a question dealt with recently 
by the United States District Court for the District of Maryland. In 
Jeno{{ v. Hearst Corp.,97 the federal court recognized and applied the 
Maryland shield law, holding that a Baltimore News American 
reporter being sued for libel could use the law to safeguard 
confidential sources who provided him four specific statements 
appearing in his news article. This interpretation aside, however, 
there remains the possibility that a state court would apply the law 
in a less expansive fashion. Conceivably, then, the law could yet 
mean that a wide range of federal bodies could compel disclosure 
while the corresponding state bodies could not. 
Nowhere in Section 9-112 does there appear a requirement that 
the newsman actually promise confidentiality to a source before he 
can claim the shield law privilege. In dictum, the Jeno{{ court 
interpreted the absence of any such provision to mean that "the 
statutory privilege [is] broad enough to encompass any source of 
news or information, without regard to whether the source gave his 
information in confidence or not."98 To convert this judicial gloss 
into more concrete protection, though, would require a provision 
expressly stating that a newsman's privilege does not hinge upon 
whether he promises confidentiality to his news sources. 
Section 9-112 also fails to discuss if and when a newsman may 
waive his statutory privilege. Courts in other jurisdictions have held 
95. Baltimore Morning Sun, Aug. 30, 1978, at A14, col. 1. 
96. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §9-112 (1974). 
97. No. H-75-692 (D. Md., filed Feb. 20, 1978). The reporter did identify non-
confidential sources. Judge Harvey wrote that "[t]he Court does not sit as a 
superlegislature to determine policy or evidentiary privileges. In a particular case 
in which state law controls, this Court is bound by the unequivocal language of 
the Maryland statute." Id. 
98. Id. See also Lightman v. State, 15 Md. App. 713, 724, 294 A.2d 149, 156 (1972). 
But see Andrews v. Andreoli, 92 Misc. 2d 410, 400 N.Y.S.2d 442 (1977) (must be 
express or implied agreement of confidentiality between newsman and source 
before privilege may be asserted); People v. Dupree, 88 Misc. 2d 791, 388 N.Y.S.2d 
1000 (1976). 
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that once a reporter discloses some of his confidential information, 
he has "waived" the privilege.99 While the United States District 
Court for the District of Maryland has specifically rejected this 
approach,l°O it might ease the minds of many state journalists to see 
a non-waiver provision written into the Maryland statute. 
One way for the Maryland General Assembly to cure the 
numerous defects existing in the state's current shield law would be 
to enact a statute providing nearly absolute protection to news-
gatherers. 101 Though such a law might incorporate the changes 
mentioned above, news-gatherers' rights should be narrowly limited 
in the area of defamation. Somehow a balance must be struck 
between, on the one hand, allowing plaintiffs too easy access to 
reporters' confidential material102 and, on the other hand, making it 
too easy for a journalist defendant to take refuge behind a shield law 
that permits him to hold his tongue and force the dismissal of the 
case against him. Before he obtains access to a reporter's protected 
sources and information, a plaintiff in a defamation suit should be 
required to make some showing that the defendant acted out of 
actual malice, defined by the Supreme Court in New York Times v. 
Sullivan 103 as knowledge of the communication's falsity or reckless 
disregard for its truth or falsity. 104 The unhampered flow of 
information to the public requires that a plaintiff be unable to reach 
a reporter's sources and information unless the plaintiff presents 
some evidence of the defendant's malice. l05 
99. E.g., In re Lewis, 384 F. Supp. 133 (C.D. Cal. 1974) (dictum); Brogan v. Passaic 
Daily News, 22 N.J. 139, 123 A.2d 473 (1956). See also The News Media and the 
Law (Report of Committee for Freedom of the Press, Dec. 1977) at 9 (discussing 
State v. De La Roche, No. 2657-76 (N.J. Sup. Ct., filed Nov. 28, 1977)), which held 
that by publishing portions of a recorded interview with an accused murderer, 
the newspaper had waived its privilege under New Jersey's very broad shield law 
for reporters). But cf. Saxton v. Arkansas Gazette Co., 569 S.W.2d 115 (Ark. 1978) 
(no waiver of all sources by disclosure of one source). 
100. Jenoff v. Hearst Corp., No. H-75-692 (D. Md., filed Feb. 20, 1978) ("Such a theory 
of wai ver is much too expansive and would subvert the legislative purpose of the 
Maryland statute."). 
101. See discussion Section XII infra. 
102. I.e., a person seeking a reporter's confidential sources could simply bring a libel 
suit, dropping the suit once he received what he wanted. 
103. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
104. Id. at 280. Accord, Sindorf v. Jacron Sales, 27 Md. App. 53, 341 A.2d 856 (1975), 
aff'd, 276 Md. 580, 350 A.2d 688 (1976); General Motors Corp. v. Piskor, 27 Md. 
App. 95,340 A.2d 767 (1975), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 277 Md. 165,352 A.2d 810 
(1976), aff'd, 281 Md. 627, 381 A.2d 16 (1977). 
105. Actual malice should be required where a public official or public figure is 
involved. See Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974); Curtis Pub. Co. v. Butts, 
388 U.S. 130, 153 (1967); Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 84 (1966). See also 
Saxton v. Arkansas Gazette Co., 569 S.W.2d 115 (Ark. 1978) (reporter·defendant 
in defamation suit not required to disclose his source until plaintiff makes 
showing of actual malice). 
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Showing malice is not an easy proposition, as the Supreme 
Court recognized in the recent case of Herbert v. Lando. 106 Primarily 
because proof of malice is essential to a public figure's recovery in 
defamation, the Court held that the thoughts and editorial processes 
of an alleged media defamer are not beyond the reach of pre-trial 
discovery.107 Dissenting Justices did not challenge the "state of 
mind" inquiry approved by the majority so much as they did the 
relevance of inquiry into the editorial process. In the view of Justice 
Marshall, the chilling effect of allowing editorial inquiry is 
compounded by several factors: "Faced with the prospect of 
escalating attorney's fees, diversion of time from journalistic 
endeavors, and exposure of potentially sensitive information, editors 
may well make publication judgments that reflect less the risk of 
liability than the expense of vindication."108 Most members of the 
media shared Justice Marshall's view.lOg 
VIII. OTHER WAYS TO IMPROVE THE MARYLAND LAW 
The lesson of Maryland's 1973 legislative session may well be 
that lawmakers, as well as some journalists,110 look with disfavor on 
a shield law that places only minor qualifications upon the privilege 
it grants. With this political reality in mind, the authors believe that 
the General Assembly might consider several other suggestions that 
fall short of creating a near absolute privilege and yet afford an 
added measure of protection to the press. For example, absent from 
Section 9-112 is any language which ensures that official bodies will 
issue subpoenas to newsmen only if the authorities have failed to 
106. 99 S. Ct. 1635 (1979). 
107. Justice Powell, who joined in the majority opinion, also filed a concurrence. 
Filing separate dissenting opinions were Justices Stewart, Marshall and 
Brennan (dissenting in part). 
108. 99 S. Ct. at 1664. "The deposition of Lando alone consumed 26 days and close to 
3,000 pages of transcript." Id. at 1664 n.3. Apparently Justice Marshall was so 
disturbed by the majority's opinion in Herbert and other constitutional rights 
cases that he engaged in "a rare public display of sarcasm, bitterness and pique 
at his Supreme Court colleagues" during a judicial conference on the press in late 
May, 1979. Marshall Criticizes Colleagues, Baltimore Sun, May 28, 1979, at A3, 
col. 3. 
109. See, e.g., The Hazards of Libel, The New York Times, April 23, 1979, at A20, col. 
1; Public May Be The Loser In Libel Ruling, Newsmen Say, Baltimore Evening 
Sun, April 19, 1979, at A2, col. 1. But see Are Current Court Decisions Scaring 
Off The Media, TV GUIDE, June 9,1979, at 39-42. Herbert Mitgang, author of the 
TV Guide article and correspondent for The New York Times, noted that the 
Herbert decision "might have a beneficial effect without getting into a 
courtroom; journalists would strive for greater accuracy. And there is nothing 
wrong with that." Id. at 40. 
110. For example, Gary Wills, a syndicated columnist, has been an outspoken 
opponent of a journalist's absolute right or duty to protect his sources. See Wills, 
Legalizing Dirty Tricks, Baltimore Sun, June 7, 1978, at A13, col. 1. 
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acquire the same essential information from all other sources. I 11 The 
United States District Court for the District of Virginia has 
expressly recognized only one situation which warrants subpoena-
ing newsmen - when the state's "only practical access to crucial 
information necessary for the development of the case is through the 
newsman's sources." 112 Maryland's judiciary has not similarly 
limited the power to subpoena newsmen. Consequently, the press in 
Maryland may be unnecessarily burdened with requests for 
information readily available elsewhere. 
The Maryland legislature should also clearly set forth the 
criteria that the state shall consider before issuing subpoenas to 
newsmen. The authors suggest that there be a requirement that 
newsmen be compelled to appear before a government body only 
when absolutely necessary. A reduction of the friction between 
government and press would likewise result if Maryland were to 
adopt and follow the Justice Department's written policy, which 
states that negotiations with newsmen are a necessary prelude to 
any government attempt to compel their testimony.lI3 
Once it becomes apparent through negotiations that a reporter's 
testimony is vital, he should have a reasonable time in which to 
prepare affidavits in support of a motion to quash the subpoena. A 
close examination of the Maryland rules governing the summonsing 
of witnesses and their materials 11 4 reveals that to ensure a 
111. Note that a similar requirement exists in Maryland's Wiretapping and Electronic 
Surveillance Act, which provides that an application for an order authorizing the 
interception of wire or oral communications shall include the following 
information: whether other investigative procedures have been tried and failed or 
why they appear to be unlikely to succeed or to be too dangerous. MD. Ors. & 
JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § lo-408(a)(3) (Supp. 1978). 
112. Gilbert v. Allied Chem. Corp., 411 F. Supp. 505, 510 (E.D. Va. 1976). Justice 
Stewart has suggested that a reporter should not be compelled to disclose 
confidences before a grand jury unless the government "(1) show(s] that there is 
probable cause to believe that the newsman has information that is clearly 
relevant to a specific probable violation of law; (2) demonstrate[s] that the 
information sought cannot be obtained by alternative means less destructive of 
First Amendment rights; and (3) demonstrate[s] a compelling and overriding 
interest in the information." Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 743 (1972) 
(Stewart, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted). See also Bursey v. United States, 466 
F.2d 1059 (9th Cir. 1972); Democratic Nat'l Committee v. McCord, 356 F. Supp. 
1394 (D.D.C. 1973); Rosarto v. Superior Court of Fresno County, 51 Cal. App. 3d 
190, 237, 124 Cal. Rptr. 427, 463 (1975) (Frason, J., concurring); Winegard v. 
Oxberger, 258 N.W.2d 847 (Iowa 1977); In re Farber, 78 N.J. 259, 394 A.2d 330, 
cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 598 (1978); State v. Peter, 132 Vt. 266, 315 A.2d 254 (1974); 
Brown v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 755, 204 S.E.2d 429, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 966 
(1974). 
113. See 28 C.F.R. § 50.10 et. seq. (1978); Dep't of Justice Memo No. 692 (Sept. 2, 1970). 
Journalists have been quick to note, however, that the Justice Department has 
observed the Attorney General's guidelines as much in the breach as in the 
practice. "[T]here have been occasions when a federal prosecutor's concept of a 
'negotiation' has been to approach a reporter with a demand for testimony or 
documents, coupled with the threat of issuance of a subpoena." Sharing the 
News With Justice, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. at 18, (Sept.lOct. 1975). 
114. See, e.g., Md. Rules 103, 104, 114, 115, 400, 405, 406, 731, 742 (1977). 
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reasonable period of time, it may be necessary that newsmen be 
specially notified before subpoenas are issued to them. 
Rule 742 of Maryland's Rules of Civil Procedure, which fixes the 
procedure criminal trial courts are to follow in issuing subpoenas, 
illustrates the need for special notice to the press. Presumably, it also 
applies to grand juries. Under that rule, subpoena requests must be 
in the court clerk's hands nine business days before the witnesses 
are to appear in court. 
The rule's foremost failing is that it does not stipulate precisely 
how much time to allot recipients from the time the subpoenas are 
served on them until the time they must appear in court. Currently, 
this is a matter lying within the court's discretion. If the time 
decreed is too short, a judge may, on request, issue a protective 
order.1l5 Such an order allows the subpoenaed party a reasonable 
time to obtain an attorney, who may try to quash the subpoena or 
limit its scope. Even though it may choose not to issue any protective 
orders, a court in Maryland generally will hold a journalist In 
contempt only after an unsuccessful show cause hearing. 
IX. TOWARD THE IDEAL SHIELD LAW 
Despite its ambiguities and inadequacies, Maryland's shield law 
reflects in many respects an enlightened approach to the protection 
of the flow of information to the public. Unlike the laws of some 
other states,116 it protects more than newspapers alone; it imposes no 
minimum circulation requirement on the newspapers it protects; 11 7 it 
allows newsmen to plead the privilege before a comparatively large 
number of governmental bodies; and it does not make the privilege 
contingent upon the good faith of the reporter. ll8 The wording ofthe 
Maryland law, moreover, leaves no doubt that official bodies must 
115. For example, William B. Reinckens, a reporter for the Prince George's County, 
Maryland Sentinel, wrote five articles about a county sheriff, which led to the 
sheriffs indictment on charges of fraud and perjury. The reporter was served a 
summons demanding that he appear before the Circuit Court for Prince George's 
County, Maryland within a single business day and bring with him all 
newspaper articles, notes, tape recordings, memos, documents, records, letters, 
receipts, literature, slides, photos, and other material directly or indirectly related 
to the charges against the sheriff. State v. Ansell, Crim. No. 18539, 1.8543 (Cir. 
Ct. for Prince George's County, Maryland). 
116. See, e.g., MICH. COMPo LAws § 767.5a (1968). See also Note, State Newsman's 
Privilege Statutes: A Critical Analysis, 49 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 150 (1973). 
117. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 2-1733 (Burns 1968). To be a newspaper within its 
statute's protection, Indiana requires a newspaper to be issued at intervals of no 
less than once a week, that it be published in the same city or county for at least 
five consecutive years, and that it have a paid circulation of at least two percent 
of the population of the county in which it is published. Obviously, this would 
exclude all but the most successful publications. About one-half the states protect 
press associations, and slightly less than one-half shield periodicals. See 
Graham, Paper, supra note 15, at 77. 
118. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-917 (1977). 
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respect a newsman's rights under the statute.l19 Finally, there is no 
provision in Maryland's statute which expressly states that a 
newsman waives his privilege upon partial disclosure. l20 
While such strengths may make Maryland's law better than 
those of some other states, it is unquestionably worse than those of 
several other states, notably New Jersey and California, whose 
shield laws journalists believe to be the most liberal in the nation. 121 
Both these states protect information as well as the source of that 
information, and both shield from government reach unpublished as 
well as published information.122 From the standpoint of many 
journalists, each state's statute has positive features that the other 
lacks. For example, New Jersey's law, the more recent of the two, 
goes further than California's in granting a privilege to those "on 
whose behalf news is gathered."123 This gives standing to members 
of the public at large to oppose a compelled disclosure. California's 
la w, on the other hand, defines "news-gatherers" in a far broader 
fashion than New Jersey's. A news-gatherer in California is one 
"who is or has been connected with or employed by a publication,"124 
a definition which reduces the number of persons the state may hold 
in contempt. 125 
In drafting an ideal shield law for Maryland, the legislature 
should look to the California and New Jersey shield laws as models. 
As good as they are, however, even these statutes may not 
sufficiently protect a newsman's interests. The recent, much 
publicized New Jersey case of Farber v. State126 makes this point 
plain. 
X. PIERCING THE SHIELD: THE FARBER CASE 
In 1968, thirteen people died mysteriously at a New Jersey 
hospital. A grand jury looked into these unexplained deaths but. 
decided not to bring charges. Ten years later, New York Times 
119. See note 82 supra. 
120. E.g., New Mexico expressly provides for waiver. N.M. STAT. ANN. §2Q-1-12.1C 
(Supp. 1975). 
121. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070 (West Supp. 1979); N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A.84A-21 (Supp. 
1978-79). The strength of the New Jersey statute was recognized by the New 
Jersey courts in In re Farber, 78 N.J. 259,394 A.2d 330, cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 598 
(1978). See text accompanying notes 136 and 137 infra. 
122. But see CBS v. Superior Court, 85 Cal. App. 3d 241, 149 Cal. Rptr. 421 (197R) 
(where underlying purpose of agreed confidentiality between network and 
undercover police officers had been lost, unpublished video and audio "outtakes" 
ordered disclosed notwithstanding California shield law, which protected 
disclosure of "unpublished information"). 
123. N.J. REV. STAT. §§ 2A.84A-21, .84A-21a (Supp. 1978-79). 
124. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070 (West Supp. 1979). 
125. The statute, however, fails to consider the freelance writer who has just 
embarked upon a journalistic career. See note RR supra. 
126. 78 N.J. 259, 394 A.2d 330, cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 598 (197R). 
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reporter Myron Farber continued the investigation the grand jury 
had abandoned. In his reports, Farber quoted unnamed sources who 
said the person responsible for the deaths was a certain "Dr. X." 
Probably in direct response to the Farber articles, a New Jersey 
prosecutor had Dr. Mario Jascelovich indicted for murder. Farber 
testified at length about his own investigation at the ensuing murder 
trial. Not satisfied with Farber's testimony, Jascelovich's attorney 
demanded from Farber all notes, tapes, and names of anonymous 
sources, as well as the contents of interviews Farber had conducted 
with people he freely identified. Jascelovich's attorney claimed this 
material was necessary to his client's defense. 127 Rather than accede 
to the demand, Farber cited the New Jersey shield law, which grants 
a "privilege to refuse to disclose, in any legal or quasi-legal 
proceeding ... a) The source, author, means, agency, or person from 
or through whom any information was procured ... and b) Any 
news or information obtained in the course of pursuing his 
professional activities whether or not it is disseminated."128 
Before deciding if this requested material was relevant, material, 
and necessary to the defense and unattainable under the New Jersey 
shield law, the judge announced that he would examine Farber's 
documents in camera.129 Once again, both Farber and the Times 
refused to cooperate. In a statement, Farber explained why: 
If I, as a journalist, accept information on a confidential 
basis, I cannot disavow that agreement later, not without 
destroying my integrity. If I was willing to permit any 
devaluation of my ethical currency, I would soon find that 
my worth had eroded completely. And I could not work that 
way. 130 
To give legal weight to these ethical objections, Farber continued 
to rely upon the shield law and the first amendment. Held in 
contempt, jailed 139 days, and fined $1000, Farber yet held fast to 
his convictions, aided in no small part by the financial and legal 
support of his employer. 131 Farber's tenacious stand was to no avail; 
the New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's contempt 
citations against him and the Times,132 holding that the New Jersey 
127. Id. at 289, 394 A.2d at 345 (Pashman, J., dissenting). See generally White, Why 
the Jailing of Farber 'Terrifies Me,' supra note 29, at 27. 
128. N.J. REV. STAT. §§ 2A.84A-21, .84A-21a (Supp. 1978-79). 
129. 78 N.J. at 264, 394 A.2d at 332. 
130. The New York Times, July 25, 1978, at B6, col. 5. 
131. A fine of $5,000 per day was imposed upon the New York Times for every day 
that Farber and the Times refused to comply with the lower court's order to 
produce the subpoenaed materials. 78 N.J. at 264, 394 A.2d at 332. Thus, the 
Times paid a total of $285,000 in fines. The Court Ducks, Baltimore Sun, Dec. 6, 
1978, at A22, col. 1. 
132. 78 N.J. at 270. 394 A.2d at 341. 
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shield law must bow to the defendant's sixth amendment right to a 
fair trial. 133 Before a bona fide newsman like Farber could be 
compelled to submit subpoenaed materials to a trial judge for a 
preliminary in camera inspection, the Farber court, however, would 
require the defense to satisfy certain threshold requirements at a full 
hearing. Jascelovich would have to demonstrate by a fair preponder-
ance of the evidence, including all reasonable inferences, that there 
was a reasonable probability that the information sought by the 
subpoena was material and relevant to his defense, that it could not 
be secured in any less intrusive manner, and that the defendant had 
a legitimate need to see it.134 
The Farber court's balancing approach illustrated that even a 
virtually unqualified shield law such as New Jersey's cannot protect 
the press from compulsory disclosure when constitutionally pro-
tected rights are threatened. It also called to mind Justice Douglas' 
eloquent dissent in Branzburg, when he alone voiced the view that 
reporters, with one exception, should never be compelled to testify 
before grand juries. That single exception applied to circumstances 
when newsmen themselves were directly involved in crimes. Douglas 
wrote: 
My belief is that all of the "balancing" was done by those 
who wrote the Bill of Rights. By casting the First 
Amendment in absolute terms, they repudiated the timid, 
watered-down, emasculated versions of the First Amend-
ment which both the government and the New York Times 
advance in this case .... Sooner or later, any test which 
provides less than blanket protection. . . will be twisted and 
relaxed so as to provide virtually no protection at all. 135 
Echoing the words of Justice Douglas was dissenting Judge 
Pashman of the Farber court. According to him, the New Jersey law 
133. Id. at 272, 394 A.2d at 336-37. The court restated the maxim that "where 
Constitution and statute collide, the latter must yield." Id. at 272, 394 A.2d at 
336. The court also found that the New Jersey shield law violated Article 1, ~ 10 
of the New Jersey Constitution, which provides as follows: 
In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to a 
speedy and public trial by an impartial jury; to be informed of the nature 
and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against 
him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor; 
and to have the assistance of counsel in his defense. 
The court cited United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), as support for the 
proposition that compulsory process is fundamental to the functioning of our 
criminal justice system. 
134. 78 N.J. at 276-77, 394 A.2d at 338. In his concurring opinion, Chief Judge 
Hughes stressed that the information sought in Farber was "demonstrably 
inaccessible." Id. at 281, 394 A.2d at 341 (Hughes, C.J., concurring). In his 
dissent, Judge Handler emphasized that "the court's insistence upon the 
requisite showing of need should be unyielding and meticulous." Id. at 305, 394 
A.2d at 353 (Handler, J., dissenting). 
135. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 713 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
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"is not an irritation. It is an act of the Legislature."136 As a 
legislative enactment drafted in absolute terms, the statute gives the 
court "no discretion to determine on a case-by-case basis whether the 
societal importance of a free and robust press is 'outweighed' by 
other assertedly more compelling interests."137 
Like Douglas and Pashman, former Yale Law School Professor 
Thomas I. Emerson has advocated an impenetrable shield protecting 
the confidentiality of reporters' sources and information. Says 
Emerson: 
If you have a partial shield, then the courts have to decide 
every case, and that, inevitably, entails balancing. One of 
the major arguments about the First Amendment is whether 
or not you can devise legal doctrine that doesn't have the 
disadvantage of balancing because balancing leaves every-
thing completely open. Without flat rules, without real units 
to balance on each side, the courts can do anything they 
want, as can the police, the prosecutors or any government 
official. And of course the reporter doesn't know in advance 
any more where he stands. He can't possibly pledge 
confidentiality, because it may turn out later that the 
balance will tilt against him.13s 
There are others in the law and in the media who make similar 
points. Associate Professor Vincent A. Blasi of the University of 
Michigan Law School suggests, for example, that it should be as 
clear as possible to both newsman and informant just what data can 
pass between them without either one fearing that the reporter will 
later be forced to reveal his source or his information.l39 For Blasi, 
the ideal shield law would not keep newsmen from testifying on 
planned, future crimes of violence, the whereabouts of fugitive 
felons, or observations of crimes to which they were the only 
eyewitnesses.14o To allow judges the discretion to compel journal-
ists' testimony in situations of "overriding government need," 
however, would render any shield law almost useless, according to 
Blasi. Given such discretion, judges would too frequently choose to 
waive the shield. HI 
Like Blasi, Jack Landau, Director of the Reporters' Committee 
for Freedom of the Press, finds judges ingenious in discovering 
136. 78 N.J. at 286, 394 A.2d at 343 (Pashman, J., dissenting). 
137. [d. at 288, 394 A.2d at 344. 
138. Friedman, Siege, supra note 42, at 48. 
139. See Blasi, The Newsman's Privilege: An Empirical Study, 70 MICH. L. REV. 229 
(1971). 
140. [d. 
141. See Paul, Why A Shield Law?, 29 U. MIAMI L. REv. 459 (1975), on how drafting 
difficulties can be overcome. See also O'Neil, Shield Laws: Partial Solution to a 
Pervasive Problem, 20 N.Y.L.F. 515, 521-22 (1975). 
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statutory loopholes that will permit them to force reporters to testify 
or face stiff consequences if they do not.142 He notes, for example, 
that in Branzburg a judge ordered newsman Paul Branzburg to tell a 
grand jury the source of his drug abuse story despite Kentucky's firm 
shield law that purported to protect reporters' sources. There the 
judge found a loophole identical to that found in Lightman; 
Branzburg was said to have been his own source of information. 
Likewise, the strong California law protecting reporters' sources 
failed to protect newsman William Farr. By waiting until Farr was 
temporarily unemployed, a Los Angeles judge was able to order Farr 
to talk, finding him outside the statutory definition of a "news-
gatherer."143 The moral of such stories, states Landau, "is that 
shield laws should be as broad and tight as words will permit or 
judges will find ways to evade the intent of the statutes."144 
Broad exceptions, such as those necessary "to prevent a 
miscarriage of justice" or "to protect the public interest," if made 
part of a Maryland shield law, might so weaken the privilege that 
the exceptions would swallow the rule. This is the view of the 
Twentieth Century Task Force on the Government and the Press. 145 
Qualifications of the shield law, it is thought, rather than being 
necessary, might lead to newsmen being easily divested of the 
privilege. Moreover, the Task Force trusts that newsmen will usually 
volunteer information before a true "miscarriage of justice" can 
occur.146 
XI. THE STANFORD DAILY CASE: THE SHIELD DESTROYED? 
Regardless of how absolute an evidentiary privilege for journal-
ists might be, it can provide no more than minimal protection if the 
government, through means other than subpoena, can force them to 
furnish the information they have gathered. An absolute shield law 
might be useless, for example, if police could obtain an ex parte 
search warrant and scour a newsroom for evidence of possible 
wrongdoing by persons other than the newsroom staff. In May, 1978, 
the United States Supreme Court held that the police may do exactly 
that. The Court's 5-3 decision in Zurcher v. Stanford Daily147 came 
142. Landau & Graham, Federal Law, supra note 31, at 33. Arthur Taylor, as newly 
appointed chairman of First Amendment Research and Defense Campaign of the 
Reporters' Committee for Freedom of the Press, made a speech on May 30, 1975, 
in which he said that "[s]tate laws designed to protect journalists [from such 
efforts] have been interpreted so narrowly as to be virtually useless against 
forced disclosure." PUBLISHER'S WEEKLY, June 9, 1975, at 28. 
143. See text accompanying note 124 supra. 
144. Landau & Graham, Federal Law, supra note 31, at 34. 
145. Press Freedoms Under Pressure, Twentieth Century Task Force on the 
Government and Press (N.Y. 1972) at 12. 
146. Graham, Paper, supra note 15, at 80. 
147. 436 U.S. 547 (1978). 
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as a severe shock to those in the media who had been watching the 
case's eight-year odyssey to the high court. 
The Stanford Daily case stemmed from the April, 1971 
demonstrations at the Stanford University Hospital during which 
nine Palo Alto police officers were injured. The day after the 
demonstrations, the Stanford Daily published photographs of the 
tumultuous happenings, unwittingly giving police the hope that the 
newspaper could identify those persons who had injured the officers. 
Three days later, the police sought and were granted a warrant to 
search the newspaper's offices for all pictures and negatives the 
Stanford Daily had retained. Outraged at the unannounced search, 
the newspaper filed suit against the police. For a long time 
thereafter, it appeared that the judiciary would side with the 
Stanford Daily. Both the district court148 and the circuit court of 
appeals149 reached decisions in its favor, holding that police could 
obtain warrants to search newspaper premises only after convincing 
a court that it was otherwise "impractical" for them to subpoena the 
sought-after items. Writing for the Supreme Court's majority in 
Stanford Daily, Justice White saw matters altogether differently: 
We decline to reinterpret the [Fourth] Amendment to impose 
a general constitutional barrier against warrants to search 
newspaper premises .... Nor are we convinced ... that 
confidential sources will disappear and that the press will 
suppress news because of fears of warranted searches. .. . 
In deciding whether to issue wa~ants, judges and magis-
trates are nonetheless free to consider the impact on press 
freedom. 150 
A disappointed media took what solace it could from the dissenting 
words of Justice Stevens: "This holding rests on a misconstruction of 
history and of the Fourth Amendment's purposely broad lan-
guage."151 The majority's holding, continued Stevens, expanded the 
number and type of law-abiding persons who might become the 
subject of unannounced police searches. More important, at least 
from the media's standpoint, it allowed prosecutors to inspect 
privileged documents that "could not be examined if advance notice 
gave the opportunity to object."152 The decision did away with the 
requirement that a need be shown before such information could be 
made available. This requirement was stressed by majority and 
dissenting judges alike in the Farber case decided a few months 
148. Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 353 F. Supp. 124 (N.D. Cal. 1972). 
149. Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 550 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1977). 
150. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 567 (1978). 
151. [d. at 577 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
152. [d. at 579. 
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later. 153 Mter Stanford Daily, Stevens wrote, police could win 
approval for a forced search without stating under oath that 
ad vance notice would result in the hiding or destruction of the 
sought-after evidence.154 
The media reacted to the majority's decision as they would to 
other major catastrophes. Suddenly, it seemed, the authorities had 
discovered a new weapon to use against them, a weapon more 
speedy and destructive than the lengthy and sometimes unsuccessful 
process of using a subpoena to force a reporter to disclose his 
sources.155Howard K. Smith, ABC-TV commentator, called the 
decision "nazi-like" and the "worst and most dangerous" opinion the 
"Court has made in memory."156 The New York Times' James 
Reston responded to the Stanford Daily decision with a letter and 
column to Justice White. In them Reston noted the devastating 
impact the opinion would have had on investigative journalism had 
the Court issued it several years earlier: 
It would have been easy for Nixon to get a court order to raid 
the New York Times. He knew precisely where the Pentagon 
Papers were .... Under this Supreme Court ruling, he 
would have been able to seize them and block the publica-
tion of the Vietnam story. If your majority judgment, Justice 
White, had been in place as the law at the time of the 
Watergate break-in, Nixon would probably have been able to 
coverup the whole political and moral mess. The cops would 
have been able to come into the Washington Post, armed 
with court orders, and have been in a position to intimidate 
everybody in command.157 
153. See note 134 and accompanying text supra. Judge Handler wrote that it is not 
satisfactory merely to "disclose some likelihood that some material sought is 
somewhat relevant, [or to present] a bare conclusion as to its necessity, [or to 
remain] silent as to alternative sources and ... indifferent to matters of 
overbreadth, oppressiveness and unreaso:6.ableness." Judge Handler would 
require that there be a showing that the information sought is specifically 
material as to guilt, necessary to the search for truth and that no other feasible 
means of procuring the same information be available, a far cry from the 
procedure that Stanford Daily approves. In re Farber, 78 N.J. at 306,394 A.2d at 
353 (Handler, J., dissenting). The ramifications of the Stanford Daily decision 
reflect the warning of the Farber majority: "We wish to make it clear, however, 
that this opinion is not to be taken as a license for a fishing expedition in every 
criminal case where there has been investigative reporting, nor as permission for 
an indiscriminate rummaging through newspaper files. Id. at 277, 394 A.2d at 
338-39. The New Jersey court is not the only one to exhort against the use of 
such "fishing expeditions." See note 112 supra. 
154. 436 U.S. 547, 583 (1978) (Stevep-.;, J., dissenting). 
155. Jack Landau, Director of the Reporters' Committee for the Freedom of the Press, 
has commented that "[i]f you're concerned about the destruction of editorial 
power, the scope of that [Stanford Daily] type of intrusion, compared with a 
subpoena to disclose a single confidential source, is enormous." Landau, NEW 
TIMES, Dec. 11, 1978, at 42. 
156. H. Smith, Commentary, May 2, 1978, ABC World News Tonight. 
157. Reston, A Letter to Mr. Justice Whizzer, Baltimore Evening Sun, June 2,1978, at 
A8, col. 4. 
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Critics of Stanford Daily were not found exclusively in the 
media's ranks, however.158 Within a few weeks after the Court acted, 
Congress took action. As chairman of the Subcommittee on the 
Constitution, Senator Birch Bayh began hearings on several bills 
drafted to cope with the problems Stanford Daily had raised.159 In 
the House of Representatives, similar hearings began at about the 
same time, through the leadership of Representative Richardson 
Preyer, chairman of the Subcommittee on Government Information 
and Individual RightS. I60 
The bills each subcommittee reviewed differed substantially.161 
Several required subpoenas rather than warrants for searches of 
innocent third parties, but even these bills disagreed on how to 
define "innocent third parties." In some, "innocent third parties" 
included only newspapers and broadcasters; in others, they included 
almost everybody. However defined, "innocent third parties" in all 
these bills would nonetheless be entitled to receive subpoenas, which 
they could either comply with or contest. Warrants would issue only 
if there was reason to believe the party would conceal or destroy 
evidence. In short, said the bills' sponsors, enactment would 
foreclose the unsavory prospect of the surprise knock on the door, the 
waving of the all-purpose, non-specific search warrant, then the 
search itself. 
158. Maryland Senator Charles Mathias made the same point as Reston when he 
noted that "[p ]olice searching the offices of the Washington Post might well have 
found memos, phone numbers or other clues to the identity of the anonymous 
Watergate witness, 'Deep Throat.' And if 'Deep Throat' knew that, he probably 
never would have spoken," said Mathias. Wicker, The Knock at the Door, New 
York Times, June 25, 1978, at E21, col. 1 (quoting Senator Mathias). 
159. The first hearing on Stanford Daily was convened on June 22, 1978, by the 
Subcommittee on the Constitution of the Senate Judiciary Committee. Letter of 
April 23, 1979, from Kevin O. Faley, General Counsel to the Subcommittee on the 
Constitution. Together with Senators Metzenbaum and Percy, Senator Bayh had 
introduced "The Citizen's Privacy Protection Amendment of 1978" earlier that 
month. S. 3164, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978). Aimed specifically at "the dangers 
posed by Zurcher," Senate Bill 3164 was to be a "message to the Supreme Court 
that its whittling away ofthe Fourth Amendment has gone too far." [d. (editorial 
to bill). 
The bill is not limited only to protection of the media's privacy. It would 
require a subpoena duces tecum before state seizure of potentially crime-related 
evidence from a "person in possession," unless there is probable cause to believe 
that that person might be involved in the crime or that the evidence would be 
destroyed, hidden or delayed before a subpoena could be procured. The Bayh 
legislation would also give a civil cause of action for general damages, as well as 
punitive damages "not to exceed $10,000 for each violation." 
160. House Urges Protection of Press From Searches, EDITOR & PUBLISHER, Sept. 9, 
1978, at 11. 
161. See, e.g., H.R. 12952, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978); S. 3162, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 
(1978); S. 3164, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978); H.R. 13017, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 
(1978); H.R. 13113, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978); H.R. 13619, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 
(1978); H.R. 13232, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978); H.R. 13710, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 
(1978); H.R. 13909, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978); H.R. 13918, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 
(1978); H.R. 13936, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978); S. 3261, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 
(1978); S. 3222, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978); S. 3358, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978); 
H.R. 13168, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978). 
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During these hearings, members of both the House and Senate 
subcommittees learned that, though there had been but twelve 
searches of American newsrooms in 203 years, all twelve had 
occurred in the last eight years, and three in the past year alone. In 
Montana, for example, a sheriff armed with a search warrant had 
recently demanded a tape recording that an Associated Press 
reporter had made during a telephone conversation with a jailed 
man charged with murder. In California, a District Attorney had 
obtained a warrant to search three San Francisco television stations 
for film clips allegedly in their possession and allegedly showing 
homeowners demonstrating against a proposed marina. In Rhode 
Island, police used a search warrant to rifle a television station's 
film looking for footage showing a picketing member of a teacher's 
union assaulting a person who crossed the picket line.162 
Despite the infrequency of newsroom searches, Philip Heymann, 
a special assistant to Attorney General Griffin Bell, admitted during 
the hearings that the Stanford Daily decision might "look like an 
invitation" to conduct more such searches.163 The Court's decision, 
he said, might usher in a new era. On August 7,1978, Congressman 
Preyer's House subcommittee released its recommendations in a 
report called "Search Warrants and the Effects of the Stanford Daily 
Decision."164 The subcommittee agreed that there was need for 
legislation to protect all third parties from search warrants 
whenever police lack probable cause to connect those parties with a 
crime they are investigating. Similarly, said the subcommittee, 
searches under warrant should not be made by police if they lack a 
reasonable expectation that the third parties will destroy the sought-
after material. Though it seemed persuaded that the Stanford Daily 
decision would have a chilling effect on the confidential sources 
upon whom the press relies, the subcommittee chose to treat the 
press no differently from any other innocent third party. Doctors, 
lawyers, merchants, consumers, and bystanders all deserve protec-
tion, the subcommittee said, so long as they do not threaten 
legitimate law enforcement. Ironically, the subcommittee's report 
had the backing of Palo Alto's mayor, whose police conducted the 
search that gave rise to the Stanford Daily decision.165 
The bill the House subcommittee recommended was one of 
thirteen the Justice Department cast aside in favor of a bill it 
formulated itself. That bill would require police, in all but excep-
tional circumstances, to use subpoenas, not warrants, to secure 
material in the hands of newspapers, television stations, book 
162. Wicker, The Knock at the Door, New York Times, June 25, 1978, at E21, col. 1. 
163. Id. 
164. H.R. Rep. No. 95-1521, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978). 
165. House Urges Protection of Press From Searches, EDITOR & PUBLISHER, Sept. 9, 
1978, at 11. 
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publishers, and the like. For the Carter Administration, the bill 
represented something of a policy shift. The Administration had 
stood behind the Justice Department when it filed an amicus brief on 
behalf of Zurcher of the Palo Alto police.166 Locally as well as 
nationally, the Carter Administration bill has drawn considerable 
praise, the Baltimore Evening Sun calling it "A forward step ... 
passage of which will be an effective demonstration of Congress's 
good sense."167 
While Maryland and other states await Congressional action on 
the Carter bill, the media already has begun to feel the actual impact 
of Stanford Daily, or so it says. A mere two and one-half months 
after the decision, William Small, news director of the CBS television 
network, remarked that it "has scared a hell of a lot of reporters." 168 
Also, in late July, 1978, Robert Healy, editor of the Boston Globe, 
noted that one source ended his contacts with a reporter for that 
newspaper because he feared that law enforcement authorities could 
learn his identity through the use of a search warrant.169 Even 
Robert Leonard, president of the National District Attorneys 
Association and himself a prosecutor, was quick to admit that some 
news sources had dried up because of Stanford Daily.l7° The 
Baltimore Evening Sun likewise expressed despair over the impact 
of the decision: "To an immeasurable extent, the confidential sources 
who tell reporters what goes on have been lying low, not relishing 
the exposure of being named in reporters' notes that happen to be 
scooped up in a blanket, or search warrant raid."l71 
XII. MARYLAND'S SHIELD LAW AFTER STANFORD DAILY: 
A PROPOSAL 
Drafting the ideal shield law is not easy. Both the Congress and 
the Maryland General Assembly have discovered that repeatedly. We 
propose the following draft. If nothing else, it fills certain gaps and 
166. Friedman, Siege, supra note 42, at 47-48. The President's draft of the "First 
Amendment Privacy Protection Act of 1979" was proposed on April 2, 1979 and 
was accompanied by several other bills designed to protect other areas of 
personal privacy. 
167. Press Shield, Baltimore Evening Sun, Dec. 23, 1978, at 4, col. 1. In its generally 
favorable editorial on the Carter proposal, The Washington Post cautioned that 
any proposed legislation must be carefully screened by Congress. "[B]ecause 
privacy is illusive - one man's privacy is another man's cover·up - figuring out 
whether these proposals go far enough, or too far, is an arduous task." Grasping 
for Privacy, The Washington Post, April 7, 1979, at A12, col. 1. So illusive is 
"privacy" that some believe the press is not the party to be protected, but the 
party to be protected from. Nearly one-third of those questioned in a recent Louis 
Harris poll believe that newspapers, magazines and television ask for too much 
personal information. UPI Release, May 2, 1979. 
168. Court Decision Cools Sources, Newsmen Say, Baltimore Evening Sun, July 18, 
1978, at A6, col. 1. 
169. Id. 
170. Id. 
171. Press Shield, Baltimore Evening Sun, Dec. 23, 1978, at 4, col. 1. 
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clarifies the ambiguities present in the current version of the 
Maryland law: 
§ 9-112 
(a) This section grants the news media a virtually unquali-
fied privilege not to reveal sources of information or to 
disclose information, whether published or unpublished, 
transmitted or not transmitted. This privilege is grant-
ed: (1) to promote the overall freedom of this State's 
gatherers and disseminators of information; (2) to give 
the news media a free and unfettered flow of informa-
tion; (3) to perpetuate the necessarily confidential 
relationship between the news-gatherer and his sources 
of information; (4) to protect the public interest. 
(b) For the purposes of this section, "News Media" means: 
(1) Newspapers, 
(2) Magazines, 
(3) Press Associations, 
(4) News Agencies, 
(5) Wire Services, 
(6) Radio, 
(7) Television, or 
(8) Similar printed, photographic, mechanical or elec-
tronic means of disseminating news and informa-
tion to the public. 
(c) The following persons shall qualify for the protection 
this section provides: 
(1) Anyone whom the news media employs in any news 
gathering or news disseminating capacity; 
(2) Anyone whose training or experience qualifies him 
for news media employment, though he may never 
achieve that employment. 
. (d) Any judicial, legislative, or administrative body, or any 
body that has the power to issue subpoenas may not 
compel any person included in subsection (c) of this 
section to disclose: 
(1) The source of any information he procures, whether 
or not he has promised the source confidentiality; 
and 
(2) Any news or information he procures for communi-
cation to the public but which is not so communicat-
ed, in whole or in part, including, but not limited to: 
all notes, outtakes, photographs, video and sound 
tapes, film or other data of whatever sort not itself 
disseminated to the public through a manner of 
communication. 
(e) When a member of the news media disseminates part of 
the information he procures from his source of inform a-
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tion, this does not mean that he has waived the 
protection this section provides. 
(f) When a member of the news media is a defendant in a 
civil action for defamation, and asserts a defense based 
on the content or source of the allegedly defamatory 
communication, he cannot assert his privilege under 
this subsection. If the plaintiff is a "public figure" or 
"public official", this section's privilege is available to 
the member of the news media until the plaintiff makes 
some initial showing of "actual malice." 
(1) For purposes of this section, a "public figure" is: a) 
one who has achieved pervasive fame or notoriety; 
b) one who assumes special prominence in the 
resolution of a public question; or c) one who 
voluntarily injects himself or is drawn into a 
particular public controversy. 
(2) For purposes of this section, a "public official" is an 
official whose position in government is such that 
the public has an independent interest in his 
qualifications and performance. 
(3) For purposes of this section, one is said to defame 
with "actual malice" when one makes his communi-
cation knowing that it is false or with reckless 
disregard for its truth or falsity. 
(g) The protection of this section shall not be available to a 
member of the news media if his testimony has to do 
with: (1) planned, future crimes of violence; (2) the 
whereabouts of fugitive felons; (3) observations of crimes 
to which he is the only eyewitness. 
XIII. GETTING THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY TO ACT 
Section XII of this Article presents one possible version of a new 
and improved shield law for Maryland journalists. Other versions 
can and should be drafted by the A. S. Abell Corporation, the Hearst 
Corporation, the Maryland Press Association, Sigma Delta Chi, and 
the news directors of the state's radio and television stations. Unlike 
the legislators who will pass upon these drafts, the members of the 
media have the combined practical experience necessary to make the 
fine distinctions that should become the core of any new statute.172 
It should also fall on the leaders of Maryland journalists to 
develop a legislative consensus for the version agreed upon by 
members of the media. This will not be easy, because resistance in 
the General Assembly will doubtless come from proponents of strict 
law enforcement, from "balancers," and, to a lesser extent, from 
"constitutional absolutists." Those who fall into this last group 
172. Note, 77 HARV. L. REV. 556, 558-59 (1964). 
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ignore the fact that a legislative response is far better suited to 
creating a more detailed privilege173 than is constitutional protection 
of journalists. It could be years before the Supreme Court affirms the 
primacy of the first amendment. It could also be years before the 
Supreme Court decides, for example, whether to protect records of 
telephone calls, disbursements, expense accounts or other records 
that can disclose the identity of a source "as unerringly as the 
compelled testimony of a reporter."174 A statute, on the other hand, 
can specifically and immediately shield this material from disclo-
sure. 175 
We believe that most Maryland legislators, like most Maryland 
journalists, are generally satisfied with how the current law has 
worked thus far. Ignored, however, is the possibility that the shield 
law as written does not deal adequately with everyday situations 
arising in journalism in Maryland and elsewhere in the country. 
Also ignored is the fact that the shield law's protection has fallen far 
short of that intended. The Farber and Stanford Daily decisions, 
moreover, have heightened the underlying tension between the 
government and the press. For example, now that the New Jersey 
Supreme Court has held that a criminal defendant's sixth amend-
ment rights can take priority over a journalists shield law 
privilege,176 it becomes increasingly likely that Maryland defense 
attorneys will try to obtain reporters' material and testimony in 
criminal cases running the gamut from shoplifting to murder. 
Should Maryland's courts follow Farber and allow this to happen, 
Maryland's shield law for journalists would offer scant protection in 
the context of criminal trials. In a search and seizure context, 
Stanford Daily stands for the proposition that the first amendment 
173. Press Freedoms Under Pressure, Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on the 
Government and the Press (N.Y. 1972) at 16. 
174. See Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 
593 F.2d 1030 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 1431 (1979). Certiorari was 
sought by the Reporters Committee following a decision in the United States 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. On August 11, 1978, that court 
ruled 2-1 that where the government was conducting a "good faith" criminal 
investigation, it could subpoena reporters' telephone records without notifying 
them in advance and allowing them to challenge the subpoena in court. In his 
79-page majority opinion, Judge Malcolm Wilkey held that reporters surrendered 
their first or fourth amendment rights against such subpoenas the moment they 
made their records known to the telephone company, for in doing so they were 
revealing their confidential sources to a third party. 
175. The constitutional absolutists have wielded only momentary influence and then 
in only one state legislature. On December 6, 1976, 28 representatives and 
senators in the California Assembly began formal efforts to make the state 
shield law a part of the state constitution. Assem. Con st. Amend. No.4, 1977-78 
Reg. Sess. (1977). The Assemblymen hoped that in this form the state's judges 
would be more likely to give full meaning to the shield's protections, which had 
been narrowly construed because they are in derogation of the common law. 
After it was amended on April 27, 1977, Assembly Constitutional Amendment 4 
was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary and never heard from again. 
176. 78 N.J. 259, 394 A.2d 330, cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 598 (1978). 
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does not confer upon the press special fourth amendment rights; in 
effect, the protections afforded journalists against searches and 
seizures have all but vanished. 
While the constitutional absolutists in the General Assembly 
may be converted to the cause of an improved shield law, there is 
little chance the same can be done with those who advocate stronger 
law enforcement. Perhaps the most that can be hoped for is to 
neutralize their opposition. This can be done by stressing the 
frequency with which the government enlists the investigative help 
of the media. It should be pointed out that, in the long run, allowing 
the press an expansive privilege to preserve the confidences of 
whistleblowers will yield greater numbers of prosecutions. 
The public's view of shield laws can be best described as 
ambivalent. On the one hand, they have turned to the media with 
increasing frequency. On the other hand, there is some distrust of 
the fourth estate due to the power and influence it exerts. The public 
has learned the lesson, taught by the media itself, that secrecy is to 
be abhorred. Favoring sunshine and freedom of information laws 
that regulate the government, the public may not wish to see 
preferential treatment accorded the media. 
Journalists, legislators, and the public can be convinced of the 
need for a better Maryland shield law. Yet, unfortunately, the shield 
law is still too often viewed as nothing more than a favorite topic of 
conversation by members of the media. It is now time to recognize 
the shortcomings in Maryland's shield law and to begin drafting, 
organizing and lobbying. By pressing out the wrinkles in its own 
shield law for journalists, Maryland could again set an example for 
the nation. 
